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摘  要 
自关系基础的经济社会运行规则被提出，学者们便希望找出关系基础与市场
基础的种种运行机制差异及相互替代作用。然而由于变量度量等原因，迄今为止
少有文献直接专注于此类研究。受 Cheung、Rau 和 Stouraitis 等（2005）研究的
启发，本文认为，在关系型社会，尤其是在中国特殊的政治经济制度安排下，除




















































Since literatures found there are relationship-based rules working well in some 
economies, the differences and supplements of relationship-based and marked-based 
rules become interesting to many studies. However, there is little studies focus on it 
because of the difficulty in measuring Guanxi. Inspired by Cheung et al. (2005), this 
dissertation tries to find another strong relationship between companies and local 
governments under the special Chinese political and economic system, which differs 
from the classic measurement of political connection proposed by Shleifer and Vishny. 
Therefore, in this dissertation, it selects local star firms which play an important role 
in the development of local economic to contrast two competing forces in earnings 
equality. On one hand, the relationship with local government mitigates local star 
firms’ concern of high quality of corporate governance and financial statements. On 
the other hand, the market forces such as analysts and auditors can help to constrain 
earnings management and weaken the information asymmetry to some extent. 
Using a sample of 2084 firms listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
over ten-year period of 2003-2012, this dissertation examines the auditor choice and 
earnings quality, measured by the absolute value of discretionary accruals, abnormal 
non-core earnings and earnings response coefficient, of local star firms influenced 
both by the Guanxi and market forces. And whether the market rules designed can 
balance the earnings and governance problems resulted by the strong relationship 
between the company and local government.  
The results show that the local star firms have significantly less probability to 
choose big-4 and higher earnings management measured by the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals. This is consistent with the hypothesis that the relationship with 
local government will mitigate the concern of high quality of corporate governance 
and financial statements of local star firms. When introducing the market control of 
earnings quality including analyst and big-4 auditors, it finds that either analyst follow 















of local star firms significantly. However, the earnings management of these firms is 
no longer significantly high. When separate the sample into local star firms and 
non-local star firms further, the results show that the joint effect of analyst and big-4 
can decrease the earnings management and improve the earnings quality of local star 
firms significantly. 
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第一章  绪论 
1 
 
第一章  绪论 
1.1  选题背景 
公司与政府（政治）的联系在全世界范围内广泛存在。Faccio（2006）[1]发
现在研究的 47 个样本国家中有 35 个国家的公司涉及到政治联系，而有政治联系
的公司的市值总和占全球资本市场总市值的比重约为 8%。政治联系对公司价值
的增加可以通过多种途径实现，例如特别经营许可权、更少的税收负担、在竞争














































统计，从 2003 年至 2012 年的十年间，铜陵有色的销售收入占安徽省 GDP 总量
比重的年平均值为 3.28%，贵州茅台的销售收入占贵州省 GDP 总量比重的年平




通过统计上海证券交易所及深圳证券交易所的所有 A 股上市公司 2003 至 2012
年销售收入占公司所在省份（自治区、直辖市，下文统一只用“省”表达）GDP
的比重，本文发现，足以对一个地区的经济增长及发展产生重大直接影响的公司





（据本文统计，2003 年至 2012 年拥有上市公司数量最多的地区为北京市、上海
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